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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996), which gives this
Court jurisdiction over appeals from the district court in most non-domestic civil
proceedings.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendant/Appellee, Cruisers Yachts Division of KCS International Inc. (hereinafter
"KCS"), contends the following issues are presented in Plaintiff7Appellant's brief and by the
trial court's ruling.
I. Did the trial court properly determine that reasonable minds could not differ on the facts
which, as a matter of law, supported summary judgment?
II. Did the trial court properly conclude that a photograph and statements in KCS's sales
brochure, that the boat purchased by Plaintiff "offer[ed] the best performance and cruising
accommodations in its class" and had "superb handling," did not create an express warranty?
A. Was the trial court correct in concluding that the photograph and statements were
not specific and amounted to mere sales talk?
B. Were the photograph and statements in the sales brochure too vague to form the
basis of the bargain as required by the UCC?
C. Did subsequent language in the brochure which referred to KCS's limited
warranty disclaim all other warranties from the sales brochure?
D. Did Plaintiff waive any right to claim creation of an express warranty when he
waived his demand to test drive the yacht and/or when he signed the sales contract?

III. Was the trial court correct in concluding that, as Plaintiff conceded, the UCC and the
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") should be read together and, since the
plaintiff could not make out a claim under the UCC, his claim under the UCSPA and claim
of negligent misrepresentation must also fail?
Standard of Review. The same standard of review applies to all of the issues
presented. This case was decided when the trial court treated KCS's Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss as a motion for summary judgement. In reviewing the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and reviews the trial court's conclusions for correctness, giving no
deference to the conclusions of the trial court. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d
634, 636 (Utah 1989). However, the appellate court may affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if the trial court did not
rely on the ground in reaching its conclusions. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,
235 (Utah 1993).
These issues were preserved for review in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Its Motion to Dismiss (R. 336-45), Defendant's Reply Memorandum (R. 403-18) and at the
hearing on Defendant's motion (R. 466, pp. 3-22).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313 (1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 & -5 (1999) are
set out in Addendum A.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose from the purchase of a yacht, valued at more than $150,000, by
Plaintiff Joseph Boud. The yacht had been manufactured by Defendant KCS and Boud
purchased it from Defendant Wasatch Marine. (R. 274, ^ 11)
Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint in this matter, which added KCS as a
defendant, on April 24, 2000. (R.271) In that complaint, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that a
photograph of a boat cruising at high speed and language below the photograph which stated
that the yacht Boud sought to purchase "offerfed] the best performance and cruising
accommodations in its class" and had "superb handling" contained in a sales brochure
distributed by Defendant KCS constituted an express warranty. (R. 275-6, f 19; R.294-5, ffl[
115,121) Plaintiff claimed that the photograph and the statements were an express warranty
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313 (the UCC)(M) and Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act or "UCSPA") (R. 293, f 109). Plaintiff claimed KCS beached
the express warranty in the brochure. (R.295, ^ 122) In addition, Boud alleged that, by
making the statements in the brochure, KCS had negligently misrepresented its product. (R.
300, f 143)
KCS filed a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
dismiss that portion of Plaintiff s complaint which involved KCS. (R. 334) KCS argued that
the representations and photograph contained in the sales complaint were mere sales talk or
"puffing". In other words, KCS asserted the representations were too general or vague to
form an express warranty under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313. (R. 338-9). KCS argued that
3

because the allegations concerning the UCSPA and the negligent misrepresentation were
based on the same parts of the brochure as Plaintiffs UCC claim, if the UCC claim failed
due to the nonspecificity of the brochure then Plaintiffs other claims must also fail. (R. 33944) In addition, KCS argued that the language in the brochure could not have formed the
basis of the bargain as required by § 2-313; that subsequent language in the sales brochure
disclaimed all warranties but KCS's limited warranty; and that Plaintiffs actions in failing
to test drive the yacht and/or signing the sales contract waived any right to claim creation of
an express warranty. (R. 342 fn 5; R.343; 404 fii 1)
The trial court held a hearing on the motion on September 11, 2000, and, because the
court examined the entire brochure, converted KCS's motion into a motion for summary
judgment. (R. 466, p. 3) At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court granted KCS's
motion for summary judgment and issued written findings and conclusions. (R. 445-9;
Addendum B) The trial court found that the brochure did contain the language asserted by
Plaintiff and that Plaintiff read that portion of the brochure before purchasing the boat. (R.
446) The court concluded, as Plaintiff conceded at the hearing, that all of the Plaintiffs
claims "hinge upon the existence of an express warranty allegedly created by the . . .sales
brochure." (R. 446-7) The court concluded that the referenced portion of the sales brochure
was "merely sales talk" and lack sufficient specificity to form an express warranty and to be
material to Plaintiffs purchase. (R. 447)
The Plaintiff orally moved to have the trial court's order certified as final and
appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 446, p. 22) KCS
4

acquiesced in the motion, which the trial court granted. (R. 446-48). This appeal followed.
FACTS
Plaintiff, Joseph Boud, had been a prior customer of defendant Wasatch Marine and,
in December of 1998, was shopping for a yacht. (R. 273) Sales personnel at Wasatch
Marine told Mr. Boud of the manufacturer's limited warranty and provided Boud with a sales
brochure which showed the 1999 KCS model line. (R. 275-6) On page 30 of that brochure
appears a photograph of a boat which interested Boud, the Model 3375 Esprit. The
photograph shows the yacht moving through the water at an unspecified speed. Below the
photograph, the brochure stated, "Offering the best performance and cruising
accommodations in its class, the 3375 Esprit offers a choice of either stern-drive or inboard
power, superb handling and sleeping accommodations for six." The back cover of the
brochure stated: "Afreecopy of the Cruisers Yachts limited warranty is availablefromyour
dealer or from Cruisers Yachts Division of KCS International, Inc." (Appendix "C" to
Appellant's Brief) The trial court found that Mr. Boud had read the brochure before he
agreed to buy the boatfromWasatch Marine. (R. 446) Obviously, KCS played no other role
in the sale of the boat to Boud; everything concerning the sale was handled by personnel of
Wasatch Marine.1
On December 23,1998, Boud agreed to purchase a 1999 Cruisers Yacht model 3375
Esprit from Wasatch Marine for approximately $155,000. (R. 275-76) Since the yacht was

because this appeal involves only Plaintiffs allegations concerning the sales
brochure, the plethora of other facts which led to the sale are not included here.
5

not to be delivered by Wasatch Marine until May 1, 1999 and to avoid a potential price
increase scheduled for mid-January, Plaintiff gave Wasatch Marine a $15,000 deposit. (R.
276-77) Plaintiff Boud conditioned his purchase of the yacht on his own testing of the
delivered yacht. (Boud Affidavit, R. 66, ^ 19).2 When the yacht arrived, Boud apparently
waived his prior testing condition by making payment in full before taking delivery of the
yacht. (R. 278)
Plaintiff finally tested the boat on Utah Lake on May 20, 1999. (R. 279) During the
test, Plaintiff found one problem concerning the lifting mechanism for raising the yacht's
engines. (R. 279) No other malfunctions or performance deficiencies were reported by
Plaintiff after this test drive. Wasatch Marine agreed to immediately repair the problem with
the lifting mechanism. (R. 279) Following the first test cruise on Utah Lake on May 20,
1999, Mr. Boud signed a "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale" (R. 47-48) which completed his
purchase of the boat.3 (R. 67 If 28 and R. 280-1 ^ 52; Addendum C). That contract provided
that the referenced warranty (R. 50; Addendum D) was Mr. Boud's exclusive remedy:
No warranties, express or implied, are made or will be deemed to have been
made by either seller or the manufacturer . . . excepting only the current
printed warranty . . . which warranty is incorporated herein and made a part
hereof . . . [and] such warranty shall be expressly in lieu of any other
warranty, express or implied . . . and the remedies set forth is such warranty
will be the only remedies available . . .

2

Boud submitted an affidavit setting forth his version of the facts in response to
an earlier motion brought by the dealer.
3

The Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale will be referred to as the "Sales Contract"
and the Second Amended Complaint will be referred to as the "Complaint."
6

(R. 48)
After completing repairs Wasatch Marine delivered the yacht to Lake Powell, as
requested by Mr. Boud, on about May 27, 1999. The Bouds next drove the yacht a few days
later. Mr. Boud later complained that during the outings at Lake Powell the yacht
experienced several other problems. These problems included failure of the engines' gears
to mesh smoothly, overheating of the yacht's engines, and failure of the system alarm. (R.
282) Wasatch Marine dispatched mechanics who fixed the overheating problem, however,
the difficulty with the gears was not fixed. (R. 283)
During cruises on June 11 and 12, 1999, Boud claimed the yacht experienced other
problems, including continued problems with the gears and the system alarm, intermittent
difficulties with the air conditioning system, intermittent malfunctioning of the carbon
monoxide detector, generator malfunction, and some cosmetic problems with the dashboard
and a door. (R. 283-84) Following repair efforts by the mechanics of Wasatch Marine at
Lake Powell, Wasatch Marine returned the yacht to Salt Lake City for repairs. (R. 284-85).
Throughout the proceedings below, asidefromthe reparable problems with the yacht,
Plaintiffs primary complaint about the "performance" of the yacht has been that the boat will
not plane at a speed of 20 miles per hour with a full load and thus, it is not able to tow
younger water skiers at this speed. (R. 69,283) Wasatch Marine personnel apparently stated
that the yacht would plane at 20 miles per hour. (R. 274) In fact, the boat did plane at that
speed during the test drive at Utah Lake. (R. 279) Nothing in the sales brochure provided by
KCS made any statements regarding planing speeds. Plaintiff has not complained about the
7

"performance" of the yacht at higher speeds.
Shortly after the return of the yacht to Wasatch Marine Plaintiff rejected the yacht,
alternatively revoking acceptance of the yacht. (R. 286-88). Plaintiff subsequently filed suit
when Wasatch Marine refused to void the purchase agreement of the yacht. (R. 287).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant KCS first argues that the trial court properly decided this case. Trial courts
in Utah have long been vested with the authority to assess facts and determine if summary
judgment is appropriate. Here, the court correctly determined that reasonable minds could
not differ on the conclusion, drawn from the evidence, that language and a photograph in the
KCS sales brochure was mere sales talk and not an express warranty.
Defendant KCS contends that the trial court correctly concluded that language and a
photograph in the KCS sales brochure was not specific enough to create an express warranty.
The photograph showed a Model 3375 Esprit yacht moving across the water at an
undetermined speed. Language below the photograph stated that the boat "offer[ed] the best
performance and cruising accommodations in its class" and had "superb handling." The
Utah Supreme Court has stated that promotional materials may create an express warranty
under certain circumstances. Specifically, "'[i]f it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonable
person would have ventured into the transaction on the basis of a particular statement,' an
express warranty is made." State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 315 (Utah 1988)(citations
omitted). To determine reasonableness GAF states that the court should "consider such
factors, among others, as '(1) the ability of the buyer to see and understand for himself, (2)
8

the vagueness of the statement, and (3) the incredibility of the statement.'" Id. at 315.
Application of that test here supports the trial court's conclusion.
Boud was told of the manufacturer's limited warranty, but as an experienced boat
buyer, Boud insisted on a test of the boat before completing his purchase. He later
abandoned that demand, but his experience gave him the ability to evaluate the brochure
language in its proper context.
The trial court correctly ruled that the brochure language was not specific enough to
create an express warranty. CasesfromUtah and other jurisdictions show that sales language
must be sufficiently specific and susceptible of exact knowledge to create an express
warranty. The language of the sales brochure is like language which courts have routinely
held is mere sales talk or puffery and is unlike language which courts have held creates an
express warranty.
The statements made in the KCS sales brochure were so general that a reasonable
person with Plaintiff Boud's boat buying experience would have recognized them as sales
talk.
Defendant KCS also argues that several grounds not relied on by the trial court in
reaching its decision also support that decision and form alternative bases for affirming the
decision. Because the language of KCS's sales brochure was so general a number of
interpretations are possible. Due to the wide variety of potential interpretations, there is
simply no possibility that the language could be part of the basis of the bargain as required
by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313 (1997).
9

Additionally, the sales brochure, given to and quoted by Boud, contains a clear
statement that all boats are covered by a limited warranty available from the dealer or KCS.
This mention and offer of the limited warranty is sufficient to disclaim any express warranty
allegedly created by the non-specific commendations in the brochure.
Even assuming an express warranty was created by the brochure's non-specific
laudatory language, two separate grounds exist for the court to hold that Mr. Boud's own
actions waived or disclaimed any such warranty. First, because Boud initially insisted on a
test cruise before paying for and accepting the boat, he waived any express warranty since
he clearly wanted to be the judge of whether it exhibited "superb handling" or "offer [ed] the
best performance and cruising accommodations in its class." Second, by signing the Sales
Contract which expressly provides the limited warranty is the exclusive remedy, Mr. Boud
forfeited any claim to an express warranty.
Finally, the trial court ruled, and Boud has conceded, that "Plaintiffs several claims
against Defendant [KCS] all hinge upon the existence of an express warranty allegedly
created by the referenced portion of the sales brochure." (R. 446-47) Since no express
warranty existed, Boud's UCPSA and negligent misrepresentation claims must also fail.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT REASONABLE
MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER ON THE FACTS AND THAT SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE.

Boud initially argues that the trial court should have left the decision as to whether the
brochure language created an express warranty to a jury. Boud correctly points out that the
10

Utah Supreme Court recently held that a "reasonable person" standard is used to determine
whether an express warranty has been made. Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24 «[ 55, 20 P3d
876. But, Boud argues that a trial judge's "specialized knowledge of the law" disqualifies
him or her from applying that standard.
Contrary to Boud's claim, Utah trial courts have long been vested with the power to
assess facts and determine if summary judgment is appropriate. For example, in Olympus
Hills Shopping Center v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), the court of appeals recited the trial court's duty to assess facts:
A trial court may properly grant a motion for summary judgment
or directed verdict only when reasonable minds could not differ
on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented,
[citations omitted] The trial court must assess those facts in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and must
conclude, as a matter of law, that they do not support the claim
presented.
InAMS Salt Industries, Inc., v. Magnesium Corp, 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997) the
supreme court observed "legal duties are often found to exist in the context of contractual.
. . relationships." The court also noted that "the question of whether a duty exists is a
question of law"and pointed out that:
[T]o determine whether a duty exists, a court may have to
evaluate relevant facts and available evidence. However, in
doing so the court does not necessarily take upon itself the role
of fact finder. . . . [G]eneral fact questions and applications of
legal standards to specific facts are the types of questions to be
decided by a jury, but only fif reasonable persons could differ
about them on the evidence.1 Thus, where there could be no
reasonable difference of opinion on these questions in light of
the available evidence, 'the decision is one of law for the trial
11

judge or for an appellate court.'
AMS, 942 P.2d at 319-20 (citations omitted). Therefore, if "the trial court determines . . .
that reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion to draw from the evidence . . .
then the trial court should rule on the issue as a matter of law." AMS, 942 P.2d at 320.
Plaintiffs self-serving declaration that reasonable minds could differ on the
interpretation of the facts in this case does not make it so. The trial court properly addressed,
as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the brochure language and photograph and concluded
that reasonable minds could not differ that they was mere sales talk, not an express warranty.
POINT II.

NO EXPRESS WARRANTY WAS CREATED BY THE LANGUAGE OR
PHOTOGRAPH CONTAINED IN THE SALES BROCHURE.

The district court correctly concluded that KCS did not create an express warranty
because the photograph and brochure's language were not specific enough to do so. (R. 466
at p. 21). Under Utah law an express warranty may created in any one of three ways:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample
or model.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313(l) (1997) (Addendum A). Language of a sales brochure can
create an express warranty under subsections (a) or (b), under certain circumstances. State
v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 315 (1988). Although not addressed in GAF, the "sales talk"
exception in 2-313(2) is at issue here. Judge Frederick correctly concluded that no express
12

warranty was created by the language or photograph in the KCS sales brochure.
Additionally, Judge Frederick's decision did not address the alternative issues4 raised by KCS
below, including the disclaimer created by the brochure's mention of a limited warranty (R.
342 at fii 5) or Mr. Boud's conduct which waived any other warranties, including his signing
the Sales Contract that disclaims any express warranties. (R. 404 at fh 1) Each of these
reasons also supports the conclusion that no express warranty was created by the sales
brochure here. For any or all of these reasons, each of which is addressed below, KCS
contends that the judgment of the trial court should be upheld.
A. The trial court correctly concluded that the language and photograph in the sales brochure
are mere sales talk and are not specific enough to create an express warranty.
Judge Frederick correctly concluded that the language in the manufacturer's brochure
which stated the yacht had the "best performance and cruising accommodations in its class"
and "superb handling" lacked the requisite specificity to form an express warranty. For over
a century, Utah has clearly recognized that a salesman may give general praise to his own
wares "for the purpose of enhancing them in the buyer's estimation

" Hirschberg Optical

Co. v. Dalton, Nye & Cannon Co., 27 P. 83, 83 (Utah 1891). The practice, known as
"puffing" or "sales talk" is permissible provided "it is kept within reasonable bounds . . . . "
Id; Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1952).
4

The appellate court "may affirm the judgment on any ground, even one not relied
upon by the trial court." White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994).
"However, any rationale for affirming a decision must find support in the record." Hill v.
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). The issues not specifically
addressed by Judge Frederick provide additional grounds for this Court to affirm the trial
court's summary judgment.
13

While the court does not address what constitutes "sales talk" or "puffery", in GAF,
760 P.2d at 315, the court stated that for promotional materials to create an express warranty
under § 2-313(a) (affirmation of fact or promise) or § 2-313(b) (description of goods), the
materials "must be judged objectively against the meaning a reasonable person would have
taken from the statement." The court stated that "'[i]f it is reasonable to conclude that a
reasonable person would have ventured into the transaction on the basis of a particular
statement,' an express warranty was made." GAF, 760 P.2d at 315, quoting 3 R. Anderson,
Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-313:50, at 44 (3d ed. 1983). The court
delineated a three-part test to determine reasonableness: "In determining reasonableness, a
court should consider such factors, among others, as '(I) the ability of the buyer to see and
understand for himself, (2) the vagueness of the statement, and (3) the incredibility of the
statement.'" GAF, 760 P.2d at 315, citations omitted. When these three factors are evaluated
in this case the conclusion must be reached that the trial court was correct that no express
warranty was created by the sales brochure. Boud makes no attempt to folly apply the GAF
factors. Instead, the appellant's brief is a confusing attempt to obfuscate the simple issue the
district court decided.
1. Plaintiff Boud had ample "ability to see and understandfor himself' the meaning
of the brochure language.
The first factor in the GAF test asks whether the buyer had "the ability to see and
understand for himself." 760 P.2d at 315. In this case, Plaintiff Boud had the ability to see
and understand for himself. In addition to being an experienced buyer of multiple boats,
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Boud had previously been a customer of Wasatch Marine. (R. 64, 273) In fact, Boud's
experience level was such that he insisted on test driving the boat in this case before
consummating the purchase. (R. 66, 276) The fact that he subsequently abandoned this
condition can not be held against Defendant KCS, since Boud makes no such claim. Boud
clearly knew the world of boat purchases and had the experience and ability to evaluate the
statements in the sales brochure for himself.
2. The trial court correctly ruled that the language and photograph of the sales
brochure were too vague to form an express warranty.
The second GAF factor evaluates the "vagueness of the statement." 760 P.2d at 315.
Plaintiff Boud urges that such language is specific, but fails to cite any case law where
guidelines are given to determine such specificity. In fact, examination of the relevant cases
supports the trial court's conclusion that the language of the brochure was not specific
enough to create an express warranty. Few Utah case have addressed "sales talk" in the
creation of an express warranty but those that have, as well as cases from other jurisdictions,
demonstrate that a much higher degree of specificity is required than was present in KCS's
sales brochure to create an express warranty.
In Hirschberg Optical, the territorial court first recognized the existence of "sales
talk" when it reversed the trial court's judgment against an optical supplier. Hirschberg
Optical v. Daltonf Nye & Cannon Co., 27 P. 83 (Utah 1891). The court observed:
'The general praise of his own wares by a seller, commonly
called "puffing," for the purpose of enhancing them in the
buyer's estimation, has always been allowed, provided that it is
kept within reasonable bounds; that is, provided the praise is
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general, and the language is not a positive affirmation of a
specific fact affecting the quality, so as to be an express
warranty, and is not the intentional assertion of a specific and
material fact known to the party to be false, so as to be a
fraudulent representation.'
27 P. at 83.
The sales talk exception provision of former Utah Code §81-1-12 (1943) was cited
in Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 P.2d 914 (Utah 1952), where the court reviewed, in part,
statements by a feed company salesman to the plaintiff. The court held that the salesman's
statements that a certain brand of feed and self-feeding system "was equal or superior to any
feeding method then in use," "that great time and effort would be saved under the selffeeding plan" and "would be less expensive than the plan then being used by [plaintiff]"
"were a matter of puffing or sales talk and not statements of 'fact' or 'promise' as
contemplated by section 81-1-12." 241 P.2d at 916-17. However, the court did hold that the
salesman's statement that "a minimum egg yield of 65%" could be expected using a
particular type of feed was held to be an express warranty. Id. at 917-18.
More recently in State v. G^Fthe Utah Supreme Court held that a claim sufficient to
survive a motion for summary judgment was made out because a manufacturer's promotional
literature may have created an express warranty. The literature stated that a certain type of
shingle roof was "a 25-year roof and that the shingle was a "top-of-the-line, high quality,
self-sealing shingle with a product life of at least 25 years." 760 P.2d at 312-13.
In both Park and GAF, specific claims were made—in Park that at least 65% egg
production could be expected and in GAF that the product was self sealing and would last
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at least 25 years. These specific claims about the products in those cases created express
warranties. When the claims are more general or vague, no such warranty is created.
Such was the result in Moore v. Sanchez, 313 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1957), where the
plaintiffs salesmen made "various laudatory representations about the excellence of the
stock, and what a bargain it was at the price offered." In holding that these statements were
nothing more than "puffing" the court stated:
It is hardly to be expected that they would give the defendants the benefit of
a wholly unbiased and critical appraisal of their wares. Such is not wont of
those who have something to sell, a fact well known since the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary, and which gives rise to one of the best known
maxims of the law: "caveat emptor," which is applicable here. Moreover,..
. the extolling of the virtues of their products does not go beyond what is
reasonably expected in such transactions and is properly classified as sales
"puffing" and not as warranties of quality.
Moore, 313 P.2d at 464.
These cases, with Hirschberg Optical, demonstrate that the Utah courts have
consistently required that sales language must be sufficiently specific and capable of precise
interpretation to create an express warranty. The imprecise brochure language here is sales
talk containing obviously general comparisons and/or commendations of KCS's product.5
It is impossible to see how the language "best performance and cruising accommodations in
its class" and "superb handling" is sufficiently specific to create an express warranty. In
comparison to Park and GAF, where specific figures and claims about the products were
5

As noted in the Facts, above, Mr. Boud, in his Memorandum Opposing the Motion to
Dismiss filed below, included the claim that the dealer warranted the boat would plane at
20 mph, which it did at the Utah Lake test cruise. In his brief, Boud does not mention this
issue.
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made, no such specific claims were made in the KCS sales brochure. Rather, the language
in the brochure are the "various laudatory representations" which the Moore court
characterized as "puffing." Opinions from other states confirm this conclusion.
This theme of specificity required to create an express warranty is also found in cases
from other jurisdictions, some cited by Boud. The Missouri Court of Appeals has stated that
"Representations of fact capable of determination are warranties, but mere expressions of
opinion, belief, judgment or estimate by a dealer in sales talk are not." Inter-co, Inc., v.
Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257,263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (citation omitted). The Tenth
Circuit has stated "the more specific the statement, the more likely it constitutes a warranty."
Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). The
Washington Supreme Court stated that "more general statements such as . . . a Honda bike
is a good one for children are seller's opinion or commendation rather than affirmations of
fact." Federal Signal v. Safety Factors, 886 P.2d 172, 179 (Wash. 1994) (citation omitted).
Cases not cited by Boud provide even more illumination on the requirement of
specificity. As the Utah Supreme Court relied on a Texas case in GAF, 760 P.2d at 315,
Texas cases may also be helpful here. In Autohaus, Inc. v. Aguilar, 794 SW.2d 459 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990), the plaintiff purchased a Mercedes Benz after a salesman told him that it was
"the best engineered car in the world" and that it was "a far superior product" to what the
plaintiff had in the past. 794 S.W.2d at 460-61. Reviewing the trial court's finding that such
statements constituted an express warranty, the Texas appeals court considered at length the
defense of sales talk/puffing. With citations to other cases, the court listed various aspects
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of this defense that are applicable here.
First, "One consideration in determining whether a statement is puffing or opinion is
the specificity of the statement. Imprecise or vague representations constitute mere
opinions." Id. at 462. Second, while another factor is "the levels of the knowledge of the
buyer and seller," Id. at 463, the court noted that "the initial determination must be whether
the statement made is specific enough to be an actionable misrepresentation." Id. at 464.
Third, "a general statement concerning a future event should be looked at differently than a
statement concerning a past or present event or condition, especially when examining the
specificity of a statement involving the future performance of a car." Id. at 464. Finally, the
Texas court noted that "statements that compare one product to another and claim superiority
are not actionable misrepresentations." Id. Applying these principles to the salesman's
statements, the appellate court held the statements did not constitute an express warranty and
reversed the trial court's judgment. Id. at 465.
In Roxalana Hills, Ltd. v. Masonite Corp., 627 F.Supp 1194, 1200-01 (S.D. W.Va.
1986), aff'd without opinion, 813 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff sued, among others,
the manufacturer of siding materials, claiming in part that the manufacturer's advertising
pamphlet created an express warranty by the statement that the material was "specifically
formulated1' "to provide durability and weatherability." Id. The trial court granted the
manufacturer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that "the statement relates to
the value of the product and falls short of the factual affirmation or description which forms
the basis of the bargain." Id.
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One of the most succinct explanations of the difference between sales talk and
language that create warranties was offered by the Kansas Supreme Court in Young &
Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 521 P.2d 281, 290 (Kan. 1974):
[Representations of fact capable of determination are
warranties, but mere expressions of opinion, belief, judgment or
estimate by a dealer in sales talk are not. Where opinions are
coupled with representations of fact which relate to such matters
and are susceptible of exact knowledge, they constitute more
than a mere opinion and are properly regarded as representations
of fact, and, to the extent that they are representations of fact,
they constitute warranties.
This definition was referred to in Chase Resorts, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 476 F.Supp
633 (E.D. Mo. 1979), where the plaintiff claimed, in part, that the defendant's catalog created
an express warranty. It described the golf course sprinkler equipment sold to plaintiff as
"water and lightning protected11 and that it "would provide years of trouble free service."
When the system was rendered inoperable by lightning, plaintiff was not satisfied with the
manufacturer's limited warranty and sued. Citing Young & Cooper, the court granted the
defendant summary judgment, observing, "How many years of trouble free performance and
what constitutes trouble free performance are at least two questions relating to these opinions
which are not susceptible of exact knowledge and are not properly regarded as
representations of fact." Id. at 638.
The common theme in all of these cases is that general or vague statements which
merely are "various laudatory representations" of the product are not sufficient to create an
express warranty. If anything, the representation in the KCS sales brochure that the 3375
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Esprit "offer[ed] outstanding performance" and "superb handling" are less specific than the
claims made in Autohaus, Inc. ("the best engineered car in the world' and "a far superior
product"), Roxalana Hills, Ltd. (product was "specifically formulated.. .to provide durability
and weatherability"), and Chase Resort Inc. (sprinkler equipment was "water and lightning
protected" and "would provide years of trouble free service"). Arguably the statements in
Roxalana Hills\ Ltd. and Chase Resorts Inc. are far more specific in that they indicate certain
quantifiable characteristics about the products in those cases. Yet, in all three cases the
courts held that the statements in question did not create express warranties. If those more
specific statements were insufficient to create express warranties, then plainly the general
statements in the KCS brochure were not enough to create an express warranty here.
Boud cites the Utah Territorial Supreme Court's opinion in Hirschberg Optical Co.
v. Dalton, Nye & Cannon Co. for the proposition that sales opinion must be labeled as such.
That is simply not the law. As one authority explains:
[T]here should be no magic because the prefatory words "In my opinion . . . "
are or are not used if the circumstances indicated clearly that a real statement
of opinion or fact has, or has not, been made. There are some statements, for
example, that are by their nature so dependent on personal opinion that no
reasonable person would regard them as statements of fact even though
asserted positively. Such statements do not become express warranties.
1 William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series, § 2-313:3 at 2-544 (1998). In
short, labeling a statement as an opinion neither adds to nor subtracts from the statement.
While Boud avoids addressing the factors identified by the court in GAF and used by
the trial court to conclude that no express warranty was created here, his brief provides a
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smattering of quotes from cases from around the country to create a patchwork of "factors"
that have never been suggested or mentioned in any Utah case. These cases offer little
guidance to this Court in determining whether the brochure language and photograph have
the requisite specificity to create a specific warranty. None of these cases recite facts or state
any law that, when applied to the facts here, would suggest a different outcome.
3. The claims made in the sales brochure were incredible enough to require Boud to
obtain verification.
The third part of the G^Ftest for reasonableness examines the incredibility of the
statements in the promotional materials. 760 P.2d at 315. The court provides no guidance
on how this examination should be conducted. However, KCS contends that, given Boud's
level of expertise in the purchase of boats and the nature of the statements, a reasonable
person similarly situated would recognize the statements as mere sales talk and seek to test
the Boud himself before buying, as Boud initially insisted.
The broad representations which Boud claims is a warranty concern the quality of the
boat. In commenting on the trustworthiness of such representations, one authority has stated:
The rule that the seller is bound by false representations as to the nature of the
goods contained in advertising material which has become part of the
inducement of the contract, is limited to representations of fact, and does not
include mere statements of opinion as to the nature or quality of the property.
It is especially important that this should be the rule as to representations of the
quality of goods sold, for there is nothing on which people are more apt to
differ, and nothing on which they are less apt to trust each other.
3 R. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-313:114 at 86 (3d ed. 1995)
(citations omitted). A reasonable person obviously would have taken the brochure's
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statements in the same vein as most other general statements of product quality-with a grain
of salt.
The trial court was correct in concluding that the language and photograph in the sales
brochure were not specific enough to create an express warranty. While the trial court did
not specifically refer to theframeworkprovided by the court in GAF to conduct its analysis,
thatframeworkwas what the trial court in essence used. The detailed analysis set out above
demonstrated the soundness of the trial court's conclusion.
B. The brochure language is not part of the Plaintiffs bargain.
UCC Section 2-313 also requires that for statements made by the seller to become an
express warranty, those statements must become part of the basis of the bargain. The trial
court did not rely on this factor to reach its decision but this does provide an alternative
grounds to affirm the trial court's conclusion. The language of KCS's sales brochure was
so general that a myriad of interpretations are possible. Because of the wide variety of
potential interpretations, there is simply no possibility that the language or photograph could
be part of the basis of the bargain.
For example, with regard to the language the boat "offer[ed] the best performance in
its class," Mr. Boud has not attempted to define the class of boats (is it the size class, price
class, equipment class, color class, accommodations class, or country of manufacture class?)
referred to in the Esprit 3375 brochure, much less make any specific, detailed comparisons
with other boats that could possibly be in such a class in an attempt to show this alleged
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express warranty was breached.6 The inability to do so suggests that Boud really does know
this commendation is vague. Rather, Boud seems content to take advantage of this broad
commendation language by attempting to parlay it into a global warranty that covers his
discontent with everything from balky gears to misaligned doors to loose screws. Boud does
not claim that these things are not also covered by the limited warranty—or that KCS has
breached that limited warranty—he simply uses the express warranty claim as a cover for his
buyer's remorse. Regarding the brochure's statement that the boat possessed "superb
handling," Boud does not attempt to argue that the handling of this particular boat was bad
since he does not complain of any handling problems at all.
C. The brochure's mention of a limited warranty disclaims an express warranty.
The forty page 1999 Cruisers Yachts sales brochure, given to and quoted by Boud,
contains the following statement on the back cover: "A free copy of the Cruisers Yachts
limited warranty is available from your dealer or from Cruisers Yachts Division of KCS
International, Inc." This mention and offer of the limited warranty is sufficient to disclaim
any express warranty allegedly created by the non-specific commendations in the brochure.
The UCC requirement that express warranties and disclaimers be "construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other," Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(l) (1997) plainly
6

Boud does argue that "future discovery might provide some additional,
underlying information identifying on what basis these statements were made."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 39, emphasis added). However, Boud submitted no Rule 56(f)
affidavit, so this Court may not consider this argument. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d
1196, 1198 (Utah 1987). It is doubtful that such a request would have been granted, since
even now Boud merely describes a "Tishing expedition' for purely speculative facts."
Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 314 (Utah 1984).
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controls this issue. Mr. Boud seems to believe he need only remember the pictures and
descriptions in the brochure, and can safely ignore other parts. Even if Boud misconstrues
the law to require that those portions be read or pointed out to him, his argument still fails
because Boud's complaint admits he was told about the limited warranty by the dealer even
before he paid his initial deposit! (R. 275) It is abundantly clear that Mr. Boud had, from the
very outset, information in his hand alerting him to the fact that the boat was covered by the
manufacturer's limited warranty.
D. Boud waived or disclaimed any express warranty.
Even assuming an express warranty was created by the brochure's non-specific
laudatory language, there are two separate grounds for the court to hold that Mr. Boud's own
actions waived or disclaimed any such warranty.
First, because Boud insisted on a test cruise before paying for and accepting the boat,
he waived any express warranty since he clearly wanted to be the judge of whether it
exhibited "superb handling" or offered the "best performance and cruising accommodations
in its class."
The Tenth Circuit, in Cargilllnc. v. Stanford, 553 F.2d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1977)
noted that the UCC contains an objective test of mutuality of assent as "manifested by the
conduct of the parties." There is no mutuality of assent between the buyer and the
manufacturer here, where the buyer had initially reserved the right to test the goods before
accepting delivery. By so doing, Mr. Boud obviously did not consider the claimed express
warranty effective since he preferred to make his own determination of the condition of the
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boat before accepting it. (R. 66, 466) This condition is certainly reasonable, even expected,
of any buyer paying a large sum of money for a large boat.
That Mr. Boud evidently changed his mind and paid for the boat in full before the test
cruise, at the urging of the dealer, is certainly not KCS's doing, and Mr. Boud makes no
claim that it is.
Second, by signing the Sales Contract immediately after the test drive, Mr. Boud
forfeited any claim to an express warranty because the Sales Contract expressly provides the
limited warranty is the exclusive remedy.7 (Addenda C & D) Boud avoids detailed mention
of the May 20, 1999 Sales Contract he signed, which conspicuously invalidates any prior
express warranty. The supreme court enforced a similar provision contained in the sales
document at issue in Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24 ^ 56, 58, 20 P.3d 876 ("terms that
might otherwise be considered a basis of the bargain are not express warranties if the final
written contract effectively disclaims and/or excludes any such warranties."). See also 3 R.
Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-313:290 at 177 (3d ed. 1995)
("A contract may exclude any express warranty not included in the contract. As the sales
contract is based upon the agreement of the parties, there is no question as to the ability of
the parties to agree that there should not be any express warranties.") This Court should,
7

The Sales Contract (Addendum C) provided, in part:
"No warranties, express or implied, are made or will be deemed to have
been made by either seller or the manufacturer . . . excepting only the
current printed warranty . . . which warranty is incorporated herein and
made a part hereof. . . [and] such warranty shall be expressly in lieu of
any other
warranty, express or implied . . . and the remedies set forth
is such warranty will be the only remedies available . . . "
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alternatively, enforce its provisions here, despite Mr. Boudfs attempts to claim the Sales
Contract is not enforceable.
In his Complaint, Mr. Boud asserts there was no consideration for the Sales Contract,
yet he also acknowledges that consideration did exist by admitting that the dealer advised
him it would not undertake the warranted repairs until he signed. (R.. 67, ^ 25; 280, f 50).
Mr. Boud also alleges that he did not take the time to read the document (R. 281,^50)
However, the supreme court has acknowledged the general rule that:
[W]here a person signs a document, he is not permitted to show that he did not
know its terms, and in the absence offraudor mistake he will be bound by all
its provisions, even though he has not read the agreement and does not know
its contents.
Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58 Tf 12, 982 P.2d 578, 581, (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts §41(f)
(1963)).
Mr. Boud also alleges he signed the sales agreement "under duress," yet his detailed
affidavit and detailed Complaint do not specify any facts that would support such a
conclusory assertion. See, Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1064-5 (Utah
1996) (mere fact that a contract is entered into under stress or pecuniary necessity is
insufficient to constitute duress). In fact, at the hearing below this issue surfaced as follows:
THE COURT:
MR. ROGERS:
THE COURT:
MR. ROGERS:
THE COURT:
MR. ROGERS:

Well, he didn't take a test drive.
He did not until after he'd paid in full.
Right.
For it.
But my - - I don't have before me, do I, a dispute that he was
prohibited before he paid for taking - Well, it wasn't even present. It had to be ordered from the
factory.
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THE COURT:
MR. ROGERS:
THE COURT:
MR ROGERS:

Sure, but his option to pay - If he wanted.
Wasn't coerced out of him.
If he wanted to buy it, if he wanted to lock in the price he needed
to do it at the time with the deposit.

(R. 466, p. 13-4)(emphasis added). Clearly, Mr. Boud's desire to buy the boat, at a good
price, was his only motivating influence in paying for the boat and signing the agreement,
not any sort of actionable duress. The only problem Mr. Boud found with the boat at the
Utah Lake test cruise before he signed the Sales Contract was a malfunctioning mechanism
for raising the outdrives, a problem apparently remedied before he took delivery at Lake
Powell. The fact that other problems, most of which were corrected, later surfaced at Lake
Powell can not retroactively provide sufficient duress to render Mr. Boud's signature invalid.
POINT III.

WHERE PLAINTIFF'S EXPRESS WARRANTY CLAIM AGAINST KCS
FAILS, HIS OTHER CLAIMS AGAINST KCS ALSO FAIL.

As the trial court concluded, and "as plaintiff conceded at the hearing,. . . Plaintiffs
several claims against the Defendant... all hinge upon the existence of an express warranty
allegedly created by the referenced portion of the sales brocure." (R.446-7) Therefore,
having conceded this dependance on the existence of an express warranty as an element of
his UCSPA claim (R. 466, p. 14) and of the negligent misrepresentation claim (Appellant's
Brief, p. 46), if this Court agrees that no express warranty was created or became a part of
Boud's bargain, then Boud has no further claim against KCS.
Nevertheless, Boud pleads his case to keep these claims alive in his brief. They are
addressed in turn.
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A. The trial court correctly ruled that the Plaintiffs UCSPA claim is linked to the UCC and
must fail.
Not only is sales talk a defense to a UCC express warranty claim, it is also a defense
to a Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") claim, Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et
seq.„ In State v. GAF Corp. the court applied the UCC express warranty provisions of 70A2-213 to defining the existence of a UCSPA claim, citing § 70A-2-313. GAF Corp., 760
P.2d at 314-15. Therefore, if the express warranty is not created, has been disclaimed or
waived, no action lies under § 13-1 l-4(2)(a). Similarly, in Autohaus, Inc. v. Aguilar, the
court considered the UCC sales talk exception and held that "if the statements alleged to be
misrepresentations are in fact only puffing or opinion, they cannot be actionable
representations under the DPTA."8 794 S.W.2d at 462. This position is consistent with the
GAF decision. However, Boud's Complaint is deficient in pleading this claim.
Boud argues that the § 13-2-4(2)(a) requirement of "knowingly or intentionally"
misrepresenting the boat's performance characteristics9 is met if KCS "knew or had reason
to know" that the boat was defective, as opposed to the previous requirement of "intent to
deceive." KCS does not quibble with Boud's characterization of the law, only his attempt
to plead the facts. Boud's Complaint alleges that KCS knowingly intended its brochure to
8

DPTA is the acronym of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act, §§ 17.41 to 17.63, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. (Vernon 1987 & Vernon
Supp. 1990), which is substantially similar to the UCPSA cited by plaintiff.
9

Boud argues that KCS' use of the term "best performance" is a specific
representation of a "performance characteristic" as required in the statute. As noted
above in Point II.A., Boud fails to understand that the term "best performance" does not
describe or represent a specific characteristic of performance.
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go to prospective purchasers. (R. 276, ^ 20). That is not an enumerated violation of-4(2)(a),
and Boud cannot rehabilitate his pleadings or his concession by his arguments on appeal.
B. The trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation claim is fatally
deficient.
As noted, Mr. Boud admits that if the brochure language and photograph do not create
an express warranty, it will not support a claim for negligent misrepresentation (Appellant's
Brief, p. 46). KCS agrees with that assessment. Indeed, if the sales brochure's statements
are sales talk, the required "material facts" element of all his claims against KCS, including
his negligent misrepresentation claim, is missing from his Complaint, as are the required
"other elements of fraud." Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967).
But even if the brochure language was material, plaintiffs admitted actions
nonetheless support a complete defense to a claim of negligent misrepresentation. As stated
m Jardine:
The one who complains of being injured by such a false
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told
him, but has the duty of exercising such degree of care to protect
his own interests as would be exercised by an ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances; and if
he fails to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to
account for the consequences of his own neglect. The evidence
shows with ample clarity that [plaintiff] was at least remiss as
was [defendant] in this regard. He was no neophyte, but was a
man of considerable business experience.
Id. at 662-3.
Despite being an experienced boat owner/buyer (R. 273; 341,fii3), plaintiff read the
sales brochure (R. 276-7), was told about the limited warranty (R. 275) and conditioned his
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purchase on a test cruise, but then paid for the boat in full before he took his test cruise (R.
278), all without first obtaining the offered copy of the limited warranty (R. 288). It would
be totally inconceivable for a finder-of-fact to decide that it is reasonable and prudent for a
person to pay for and buy a new Hyundai without first reviewing its warranty or test-driving
it, much less a new $150,000 yacht. Such are not the actions of a reasonable, prudent person
seeking to protect their own interests.
Any argument by Mr. Boud that the dealer's actions prevented his exercise of prudent
conduct does not operate against KCS since Boud makes no claim that KCS is separately
responsible for the actions of the defendant dealer. Therefore, it can be said as a matter of
law plaintiffs claim of negligent misrepresentation is fatally deficient.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly concluded that the language contained in the KCS sales
brochure is not specific enough to create an express warranty. For this reason, and for
additional, independent reasons set forth in this brief which also support the trial court's
ruling, Defendant KCS requests this Court affirm the ruling of the trial court granting
judgment in KCS's favor.
DATED this

/

day of June, 2001.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellee KCS
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313 (1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 & -5 (1999)

§ 70A-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words
such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but
an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the
sellers opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.

§ 13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction
violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive act or
practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally:
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval,
performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not;
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality,
grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has
been used to an extent that is materially different from the fact;
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the consumer for a
reason that does not exist;
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance with
a previous representation, if it has not;
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity
than the supplier intends;
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it is not;
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation the supplier does not
have;
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer
of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the
representation is false;
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an
inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the
names of prospective consumers or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other
consumer transactions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occurring after the
consumer enters into the transaction;
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or furnish the
services within the time advertised or otherwise represented or, if no specific time is
advertised or represented, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services within 30 days,
unless within the applicable time period the supplier provides the buyer with the option to
either cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the
supplier or to extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed by the supplier, but any
refund shall be mailed or delivered to the buyer within ten business days after the seller
receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's right to cancel the sales agreement
and receive the refund;

(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct solicitation sale within
three business days of the time of purchase if the sale is made other than at the supplier's
established place of business pursuant to the supplier's mail, telephone, or personal contact
and if the sale price exceeds $25, unless the supplier's cancellation policy is communicated
to the buyer and the policy offers greater rights to the buyer than this Subsection (2)(m),
which notice shall be a conspicuous statement written in dark bold at least 12 point type, on
the first page of the purchase documentation, and shall read as follows: "YOU, THE
BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF
THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's cancellation policy
but not less than three business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR
RECEIPT OF THE PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER.";
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as defined under Title 76,
Chapter 6a, Pyramid Scheme Act;
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in response to a charitable solicitation will
be donated or used for a particular purpose or will be donated to or used by a particular
organization, if the representation is false; or
(p) if a consumer indicates his intention of making a claim for a motor vehicle repair against
his motor vehicle insurance policy:
(i) commences the repair without first giving the consumer oral and written notice of:
(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and
(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is responsible to pay for the repair,
which dollar amount may not exceed the applicable deductible or other copay
arrangement in the consumer's insurance policy; or
(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an amount that exceeds the dollar amount a
consumer was initially told he was responsible to pay as an insurance deductible or
other copay arrangement for a motor vehicle repair under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even
if that amount is less than the full amount the motor vehicle insurance policy requires
the insured to pay as a deductible or other copay arrangement, unless:
(A) the consumer's insurance company denies that coverage exists for the
repair, in which case, the full amount of the repair may be charged and
collected from the consumer; or
(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair is commenced, the amount of
money the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or
other copay arrangement, in which case, the supplier may charge and collect
from the consumer an amount that does not exceed the amount the insurance
policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other copay
arrangement.

§ 13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice by supplier
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer
transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction.
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for the court. If it is
claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be unconscionable, the parties
shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and
effect to aid the court in making its determination.
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court shall consider
circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to know.

ADDENDUM B
Trial Court's Findings, Conclusions and Order

FILM DISTRICT C0UET
Third Judicial District

OCT 17 2000'
D«puty

JOHN W. CALL, USB #0542
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendant Cruisers Yachts
Division of KCS International Inc.
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH R. BOUD, Trustee of the
Diane Mansell Boud Revocable Trust,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL and
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION

v.

Civil No. 990910029
SDNCO, INC., dba WASATCH MARINE;
and KCS INTERNATIONAL INC., dba
CRUISERS YACHTS,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Defendant Cruisers Yachts Division of KCS International, Inc's ("Cruisers") Motion
to Dismiss came on for hearing before the Court on Monday, September 11, 2000, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was represented by his
attorney Jon H. Rogers, Defendant Cruisers was represented by its attorney John W. Call and
Defendant SDNCO, Inc., was represented by its attorney Robert W. Wilde. The Court
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indicated that it was converting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to a Rule 56 Motion for
Summary Judgment inasmuch as matters outside the pleadings, specifically the entire sales
brochure quoted in Plaintiffs Complaint, was considered by the Court. The Court had
considered the memoranda previously submitted by the parties in support of and opposing the
motion. The Court then heard the arguments of Defendant Cruiser's counsel and Plaintiffs
counsel, while Defendant SDNCO's counsel took no position on the motion. Accordingly, the
Court makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds, for purposes of Cruiser's motion, that Defendant Cruisers,

manufacturer of the subject boat, published in its 1999 sales brochure, at page 30, a
photograph of its model 3375 with a caption containing the following language:
Offering the best performance and cruising accommodations in
its class, the 3375 Esprit offers a choice of either stern-drive or
inboard power, superb handling and sleeping accommodations
for six.
2.

The Court finds, for purposes of Cruiser's motion, that the Plaintiff read the

referenced portion of the sales brochure prior to his purchase of the subject model 3375 boat.
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact relevant to the Defendant
Cruiser's motion, the Court enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
J0126.1

The Court concludes, as plaintiff conceded at the hearing, that Plaintiffs several
2

claims against the Defendant Cruisers all hinge upon the existence of an express warranty
allegedly created by the referenced portion of the sales brochure.
2.

The Court concludes that the referenced portion of the sales brochure is merely

sales talk and lacks the specificity necessary to form the basis of an enforceable express
warranty under either the Utah UCC provisions or the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act
3.

The Court concludes that since the referenced portion of the sales brochure

lacks specificity to create an express warranty, it also lacks specificity to become material to
the Plaintiffs purchase and cannot therefore constitute a material fact that could be
negligently misrepresented in the brochure.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

All of Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant Cruisers Yachts Division of KCS

International, Inc., are hereby dismissed, with prejudice.
CERTIFICATION
Upon the oral request of Plaintiff s counsel made at the conclusion of the hearing, and
with the concurrence of Defendant Cruisers' counsel, the Court hereby determines that there
is no just reason for delay of the Plaintiffs right to appeal the foregoing dismissal of Defendant
Cruisers from the captioned matter. Accordingly, the Court expressly directs that this Order
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of Dismissal be considered a final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P.

\4-

w

2000.
DATED this
is / / day of September,

The foregoing Findings, Conclusions, Order
of Dismissal and Rule 54(b) Certification
is Approved as to form only:

H. Rogers /
rney for Plain iff

\j
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September _/£_, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND RULE 54(b)
CERTIFICATION was mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Jon H. Rogers
Attorney at Law
803 North 300 West, Suite N144
Northgate Business Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Robert H. Wilde
Wilde and Associates
935 East South Union Avenue, Ste. #D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorneys for Defendant Sdnco, Inc. d/b/a
Wasatch Marine
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ADDENDUM C
Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale

IV:

TOWT>l£R5£3C BOUD REVQCABLETRUGT MID
JOSEPH BOUD TRUSTEE
TOt
CFfcAtE
S NAME

\TCH NARIKE
r S, 580 W.
* LAKE CITY, UT 84115

9074 S COBBLE CAlfl^HBT

STREET AOORESS

SANDY, UT 84093
CITY

COUNTY

STATE

6019479692

ZIP CODE

8012669878

RES. PHONE

BUS, PHONE

ndI Co-Purchaser(s), if any, (hereafter referred to as "Purchaser") hereby agree to purchase the following vehicle from Seller/Dealer (hereafter referred to as "Seller"), subject to ail
itlons, warranties and agreements contained herein, Including those printed on the reverse side hereof.
DEMO YEAR

MAKE

SERIES

99

CRUISERS

STOCK NO.

RSUSW49D999

160211,45

GREEN

16

DEL. DATE

49D999

PRICE OF VEHICLE

iCOLOR

BOAT

OOOMETER

URCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE

CYL

BODY TYPE

3375

SALESPERSON

05/20/99

STUART NELSO

THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE-li
D Title (if not, explain):

SORIES/OPTIONS

BILL
OF SALE

REGISTRATION

POWER
OF ATTORNEY

PROPERTY
TAX

ODOMETER
STATEMENT

AUTHORIZATION
FOR PAYOFF

NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES
CASH PRICE (add lines 1-5)
1EBATE

160211,45

The Information you see on the window form (Buyer's Guide] for this vehicle Is part of this contract.
Information on the window torm overrides any contrary provisions In the contract of sale.

0.00)
160211>45

I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE.

0,00

DN/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE

(

(line 6 minus 8)

)TAL

TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS

FINANCING DISCLOSURE
INSTRUCTION: One of the two following disclosures, either "A" or "B", must be acknowledged. II
Purchaser agrees to be responsible tor financing, or it this Is a cash-only or cash-plus-trade-in only
transaction, then Purchaser must sign disclosure "A". If Seller agrees to arrange for financing, then
both Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure "B". BY SIGNING, PURCHASER AFFIRMS*THAT
HE/SHE HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE AND AGREES THERETO. IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE "B", DO
NOT SIGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLED IN.

ODOMETER

BODY TYPE

PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING
3E OWED O N TRADE-IN:
:E O W E D TO:
>S:

"(A)" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE SELLER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES, WARRANTIES,
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGAROING SELLER'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE PURCHASE OFT
. FURTHERMORE, PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF FINANCtOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT TERMS OF
ING is met
flANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF
THIS CONTRA^
THE PURCHA!

0,00

GOOD
UNTIL:

DBY:

SIGNATURE
X
OP PURCHASER -

ES TO ARRANGE FINANCING
ATION:

ACCJ:

I T Y AS TO BALANCE OWED ON TRADED-IN VEHICLE:
varrants thai htViht has given Sailer a true pay-off amount on any vehicle traded In,
i ts not correct and is Qreater than the amount ihownabove, Purchaser will pay the
eller on demand.

0.00
0.00
0.00
15000.00
15000.00)
160211.45,
0.00
0.00
160211.45

E-IN AILOWENCE
WE OWED ON TRADE-IN*
LLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN

(line 10 minus 11)

SITE/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omit ami line 8)
. CREDITS

(total lines 12 & 13)

OTAL FROM LINE 9
CE CONTRACT

OTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS

(total lines 15-17)

E ALLOWANCE (line 10)

0.00

AXABLE AMOUNT
(line 18 minus line 19)

$ 160211.45

SALES/USE TAX ON "TAXABLE AMOUNT"

10173.43
34.50
0»0tt
0.00

SE & REGISTRATION FEES
ERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S)
INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST

9.00

WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE
\kl LUXURY TAX

0.00
141.50

ER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE
. OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE

(lines 18, 21-27)
(line 14)

.CREDITS
\ICE DUE
— MONTH,

170569.88
( 15000.00)

"(B)" THE PURCHASER OF Tr\E MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS EXECUTED
THE CONTRACT IN RELIANC&UPON THE SELLER'S REPRESENTATION THAT SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE. THE PRIMARY
TERMS TO THE FINANCING AGE AS FOLLOWS:
INTEREST RATE BETWE6T
%AND
%PER ANNUM, TERM BETWEEN
.MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENT

.MONTHS AND
BETWEEN!

PER MONTHS AND $ .

PER MONTH BASED

ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $
.
s
IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED, THEN SELLER
MUST , WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE, MAIL NOTICE TO THE PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING. PURCHASER THEN HAS
14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT. IF HE/SHE CHOOSES, TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF
SALE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-401.
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE, THE PURCHASER SHALL:
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED;
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN* AND
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE.
IN RETURN, SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER, INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY MOTOR
VEHICLE TRADED IN. IF THE TRADE-IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF BEFORE
THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION, THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN TO THE
PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE PRICE GIVEN
BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRADE-IN , AS NOTED IN THE DOCUMENT OF SALE.
SIGNING THIS DISCLOSURE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKim HIS OWN
FINANCING.
SIGNATURE
Of PURCHASER .
SIGNATURE
OFSEUER

OTHER TERMS AGREED TO:

WMP

NONE D

AS FOLLOWS D

^

A

f n O y h|0»6i*3 Jnfewj

(total line 29 minus 30)
155569.88
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s arranged insurance on vehicle through

, insurance company. Policy #..

,

_

n the reverse side of this document, unless Seller has olven to Purchaser an Exoress Warranty In writlno. Seller makes no Warranty, express or imolled. with resoecl to Ihe merchantability.fitness lor

poao or othof wlae oonoornlng fho vehicle, porta or accoaaorloa doacrlbod heroin. Unloaa othorwiao Indloattd In writlno. any warranty It UmUod lo that prowldad by tho manuUclurtr. il any as Mourned

ed Dy Paragraph 4 on the reversed side hereof.
tees that this contract includes all of the terms, conditions and warranties on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior
^^^^^^rS:}}}
Ises thepo^leULand exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered hereby. PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTIONOF THIS AGRKWENT^KNOWLH E / S ^ A ^ E J S T T M E R M S , CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HERE OFtyJDA HAS RECEIVED A TRUE COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT. AND FURTHER
>AY TbE T^UWCEiiir SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED.
VEHICLE TO BE
. TITLE IN NAME,
SIGNATURE

c^ Ltnb

ri>/s

CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED:
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser, which
^iave been mutually agreed upon:
1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of
such vehicle in the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except
as otherwise noted on the i averse side hereof.
2. If the Purchaser does not pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the Seller
may set off against it's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. InVie event a used vehicle
has been taken In trade. Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse Itself out
of the proceeds of such sale for its expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure to complete
the purchase.
3. Seller shall not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causos beyond
the control of the Seller.
4. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER,
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS,
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS.
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF.
5. In case the vehicle sold to Purchaser is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made by Seller as to
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odometer of said us«d vehicle.
3. In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of tne terms, conditions or warranties in this agreement,
Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable attorney's foes, court costs, and collection foes.
7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her interest in this Agreement, unless Seller consents in writing.
8. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDFdD IN THIS
AGREEMENT.
9. Purchaser REPRESENTS that he/she is 16 years of age or older.
0. Purchaser grants to Seller a purchase money security inteiest in the purchased vehicle and to any proceeds of the vehicle to
secuie full payment of the purchase price. This security interest cover s all equipment, accessories, and parts that Purchaser
adds to the vehicle. Purchaser also giants Seller a security interest in the proceeds of any physical damage insurance policy
on the vehicle.
t.

If the vehicle bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form [Buyer's Guide) for this
vehicle is part of this contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions In this contract of sale.

2. IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TOWARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS;
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT,
AIR BAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE:
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF;

(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCURATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN;
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE, AND THAT
TRANSFER OF THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE TO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PURCHASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS
RIGHTFUL; AND
(o) THAT THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR 'REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED",
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," OR SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§4Ma-1004 AND 41-1a-1005
OH STATUTE(S) OF ANOTHER STATE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTENT. IF PURCHASER BREACHES THIS
REPRESENTATION ANO WARRANTY THEN PURCHASER AGREES TO BE LIABLE FOR AND PAY THE SELLER THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATED ON THE REVERSE SIDE AND THE REDUCED
VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION REGARDING THE TITLE OR REGISTRATION.
I

Purchaser also grants the Seller a security interest in the vehicle purchased by Purchaser for the purpose of securing Sollet
against losses proximately caused by Purcnase«'s breach, if any. of the wananties made in the preceding paragraph.

I. Any written notice inquired to be given Purchaser if mailed by ordinary mail, postage prepaid, lo Purchaser's mailing address
as stated on the reverse side hereof shall be deemed reasonable and effective notification.
>. The rate of interest as set forth in the Financing Disclosure section (B) of the reverse side may involve a variable rate, if therein
noted. Purchaser will rely on any credit agreement representing financing to provide the credit disclosures required by law.
including disclosures regarding variable rate:> of intorost

ADDENDUM D
Limited Warranty

DIVISION OF KCS llSTERNAtlpNAL INC,
LIMITED WARRANTY
REGISTRATION OF PURCHASE: Tbe ' ^ e r a l Boat safety Act of 1971M requires all boat manufaciurcs to maintain a record of allfirstrexail purchasers and their
current address for the purpose ofnoaficanon case of defective parts or equipment, or in case ot'don<ompliance with standards or regulations ser. forth bv this act
Failure to complete and return vour factory wn^tmry card for Our records Will waive vour right to notification of defect and/or repair at rnanuiacwes expense. THIS
LIMITED WARRANTY CAN BE ACTIY TED ONLY BY SUBMITTING THE "LIMITED WARRANTY REGISTRATION CARD^TO CRUISERS
YACHTS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS Oj! THE DATE OF PURCHASE,

i

WARRANTY COVERAGE: CRUISERS YACHTS, a division of KCS INTERNATIONAL! INC! warrants to you, Consumer, subject to the limitations and
exclusions described below, that those ports ofpe new boat mzmu&caired by CRUISERS YACHTS, and purchasefroman authorized Cruisers Yachts dealer, are tree
from detects in material and workmanship uniitr normal use and service The duration, of dus woimjnty fe as follows: {X) The structural sections of the hull and deck for
a period of 5 years beginning the date of delrvnfy to thefirstconsumer (2) As the odier part3 and components manufactured by CRUISERS YACHTS for a period of 1
yeaT beginning the date of delivery (except for xclusions bated below) & CRUISERS YACHTS' warrants die gelcoat finish below the waterlina against blistering tor
a period of 2 years from the date of sale, providbd the bottom of me boat is maintained.
WARRANTY CLAIM PROCEDURES: Iflp defect is discovered during the applicable worrariiv period. Consumer must prompdy notify the selling dealer (or
CRUISERS YACHTS) of such in writing. IrJpo event shall such notification be reeen*d bv the dealerjcor CRUISERS YACHTS) laier diah 30 davs of the discovery
of the defect. All warranrv claims mustfirstbejmade to (he dealerfromwhom the boat was purchased The dealer will contact CRUISERS YACHTS, who At that time
will determine whether the defect is covered M this limited wurrantv and advise the dealer. For worronry service the boat must be returned to the selling dealer or if
determined by CRUISERS YACHTS to our factory. A boat mav not be returned to the factorv unless prior wnuen authorization, in accordance with instructions set
forth in CRUISERS YACHTS return aumoriJation. trom CRUISERS YACHTS SERVICE MANAGER. Transportation» preparaooa. disassembly and reassembly
cost to andfromthe dealer or CRUISERS YiflCHTS will be the responsibility of the owner
REMEDY: Within a reasonable time after n< [cation. CRU1SER5 YACHTS will repair arty defect in materials or workmanship or at its option, correct such defect
by replacing nonconforming goods or parts. S ;h repair and/or new parts are warranted for the unexpired portion of the original warranty, or for 90 day3, whichever is
longer. Warranty work (parts and/or labor) shall be at CRUISERS YACHTS expense. These remedies, are the Consumers exclusive remedies for breach of warranrv
LIMITATION AND EXCLUSIONS: This|varrqnty applies only if the boat is used under noncomrafrfcwl normal use and service, and shall not appiv to the
following: (1) Boats subjected » negligence, dbusa, misuse, or accident (2) Boats subjected to improper operation, rratfenng, maintenanco or storage, commercial use or
useforpurposed other than those for which thl boat was designed. (3) Defects or damages caused by a rbrce or impact which exceeds design specifications, including by
not limited to, exposure to harmful solvents and electrolysis. (-1) Defects or damages caused by unauthorized attachments or modifications (5) Anv statements,
representations or warranties given by dealers pr third persons other than those provided within um warranty {6) Any uml which is port of a rentalfleet,used for racing
or commercial purposes. (7) The following consequential damages: (a) h»s of time, (bj inconvenience, (c) towmg charges. (<f) expenses for travel, lodging, telephone and
fuel, re) loss or damage to personal property oj loss of revenue, (f) loss of use of the boat, (g) haulj c\ic launch, lift charges. <5) This wananry specifically does not apply
to engines, stern drives, transmission, generawp, propellers, improper adjustment of controls, adjustment or realignment to any components including, but not limited to
the drive tram and any other park expressly vflairanted by the manufacturer thereof (9) Abo excluded Are gelcoat crazing, gelcoac lading, stainless steel hardware,
windshields, glass breakage, all vinyl upholsttty, cockpit seal wood, aery he top enclosures, carpet, .electronics, gauges and other equipment or accessories manufactured
bv manulhcrurers other than Cruisers Yachts, riuch are separately warranted by such other manufacturers (appropriate adjustments therefore being provided by their
respective nianufiiccurnrs). L\0) Anv published] or announced catalog or nertbnnance cbaractcnsac of speed, fiicl and oil consumptions and italic or dvnamic attitude in
the water. (I D Cruisers Yachts shall not be etfecuve or actionable if any repairer replacement work is performed by any unaudvorized party.
THE FOREGOING WARRANTIES AREKEXCLUSIVE AND IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER EXPRESSED WARRAiNTlES, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, DO NOT EXTEND
BEYOND THE DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES PROVIDED HEREIN.
IN NO CASE SHALL CRUISERS Y A C O T S BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES BASED UPON
BREACH OF WARRANTY, BREACH OF CONTRACT, STRICT TORT, OR ANY OTHER LEGAL THEORY. THIS LIMITATION DOES NOT
APPLY TO CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURY,
SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION AS LIMITATION OR INCIDENTAL) OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR LIMITATIONS
ON HOW LONG AN IMPLIED WARRANTY LASTS, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATIONS OR EXCLUSIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.
TRANSFERABILITY: All rights and terms] of this limited warranty may be transferred to new, owners of the covered product by completing a TRANSFER OF
WARRANTY FORM and submitting it to dhiisere Yachts
THIS WARRANTY GIVES YOU SPECflftC LEGAL RIGHTS AND YOU MAY AtSO HAVE OTHER RIGHTS WHICH MAY VARY FROM STATE
TOSTATE
I
CRUISERS YACHTS reserves theright
c to
to iBnprove
improve its products through changes in design and/or ma'tcnal without being obligated to owners of boats of surular or die
samo modal cr prior manufacture.
H
CRUISERS YACITTS, a division of KCS SfflRK AGONAL ftC
304 Pecor Street. Oconto WI 54153 USA
Focne (920) 834-2211 Fax (920U3 4-2797

